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Producing Knowledge in an Era of Globalization: Two Examples 
I want to begin with two examples from the United States of ‘capitalizing’ Asian Studies. 
The first example is a project called ‘Asia in the Schools.’ Funded by the Freeman 
Foundation and coordinated by the New York-based Asia Society, Asia in the Schools is 
a laudable push toward better K-12 education about Asia in the US. A tour of the 
project’s web site in 2001 suggested that the issue driving its mission of ‘preparing young 
Americans for the demands of a complex global order in which Asia looms large’ seems 
to be this: is America ready for the challenge of the Asia market?1 Or, we may have won 
the Cold War, but are we prepared to win the ‘Pacific Century?’ Or, is American 
capitalism prepared to meet the demands of a robust, WTO sanctioned China market? 
Thus, the project’s initial web site tracked Asia-related curricula in each US state, 
correlated with state-level data on trade with Asia—presumably as a way of evaluating 
whether states were matching their Asian market capacity with adequate education about 
Asia. Now, I don’t want to pick on this project: I think it’s an excellent project, and I 
think we’re lucky to have the Freeman Foundation around to fund it. I do want to 
recognize, however, that the production of knowledge is never neutral, and that Asia in 
the Schools seeks to produce knowledge within a broader context in which US economic 
interests in Asia make certain kinds of knowledge about Asia valuable. 
 
The second example of ‘capitalizing’ Asian Studies is rather more literal than the first: in 
the 1990s, the US Association for Asian Studies (AAS) had accumulated a significant 
portfolio in stock holdings, much of which was international. In 1999 alone the AAS 
                                                          
1 In 2001, Asia in the Schools could be found at http://www.asiaintheschools.org/. The current site is 
http://www.internationaled.org/. A complete report on the initiative can be found at 
http://www.internationaled.org/report.htm. See also http://www.askasia.org/. 
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 investment portfolio grew by some $857,000 (Duus 2000, pp. 6-7). This raises some 
particularly bothersome questions for some of the AAS membership. During the Asian 
financial crisis, when Indonesia’s economy (and a good many of its poorer citizens) lay 
dying from the ‘drive-by shooting’ of derivatives speculators, causing overnight an 86% 
drop in the value of its stock market, US stock values increased by 31% (Kristof & Wyatt 
1999).2 So US Asianists might feel rather uncomfortable about the possibility that some 
of the remarkable success that their organization’s holdings have enjoyed have not been 
so innocently realized. According to a recent letter by AAS president Peter Duus, the 
association maintains a ‘socially conscious’ approach to its investments on a case-by-case 
basis, but socially conscious investing is clearly secondary to assuring the ‘maximum 
long term performance of the AAS investment portfolio’ (Duus 2000). It is probably 
worth mentioning, too, that in this same letter, Duus quotes Deng Xiaoping’s rhetorical 
remonstration to his fellow countrymen to throw off their shackles of egalitarianism. ‘To 
get rich is glorious,’ Deng and Duus tell us. Now, if the Association’s pursuit of wealth 
must be legitimized by a man who oversaw China’s transformation over the past 20 years 
into one of the world’s most unequal societies—not to mention his army’s massacre of 
anti-corruption protesters in 1989—this is indeed troubling. But I don’t mean to pick on 
the AAS either. The concept of ‘socially conscious’ investing is, after all, highly suspect, 
and may be nothing more than a panacea for our collective liberal guilt. But the issue 
points to a larger concern that I want to explore in this paper: Not only is knowledge 
production never neutral, but it is intimately tied up with broader political economic 
processes in often very mundane ways. 
 
In some respects, these are two examples of what Appadurai has called ‘anxieties of the 
global’: the first case suggests an anxiety over meeting the challenge of globalization, 
while the other is a moral anxiety over the ethics of globalization. ‘Everyone in the 
academy,’ Appadurai observes, ‘is anxious to avoid seeming to be a mere publicist of the 
gigantic machineries that celebrate globalization’ (2000, p.1). And yet, we strive to make 
our knowledgeable voices heard among the hum of global media churning out ticker-tape 
                                                          
2 This is not to insist on a direct correlation between US stock portfolio increases and Asia’s market 
demise, but rather to illustrate how the booms and busts of world markets are regional rather than global.  
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 parades of information; we strive to meet the challenge of globalization just as we 
distance ourselves from it. 
 
These anxieties arise as the result of a broader set of changes both in the global political 
economy, and in the nature of area studies scholarship. My goal here is to discuss these 
changes in parallel in order to clarify the relationship between the two. I’ll start with the 
shift in the nature of area studies, as demonstrated by shifting funding priorities. This 
shift, I will argue below, mirrors a larger shift in global political economy, in which the 
scales at which geographical knowledge is produced are increasingly in flux. Scholarship 
is subsequently left scrambling to both understand this shift and make its knowledge 
production somehow relevant and valuable in an arena in which knowledge about Asia is 
being produced and diffused from an increasingly diverse array of sources, in which area 
studies scholars are perhaps increasingly marginalized. 
 
The Shift in Area Studies 
By now most area studies scholars have come to realize that the terrain of our field has 
been shifting away from producing knowledge about areas as coherent and bounded 
units, to a focus on processes that increasingly link areas together. Notwithstanding the 
Bush administration’s efforts to re-imagine the world as fundamentally divided along the 
age-old fault-lines of religion and morality, funding imperatives for area studies have 
shifted from cold war geopolitics to concerns over trade relations, globalization, 
developing markets and market institutions in post-socialist states.3 Within the American 
AAS, this shift has been recognized for some time, as evidenced, for example, by a 
presidential panel in 1997 on the ‘Futures of Asian Studies.’ 
(http://www.aasianst.org/Viewpoints/futures.htm). Other institutions have recognized it 
as well. For example, the ‘Regional Worlds’ project at the University of Chicago seeks to 
replace what Appadurai refers to as ‘trait’ geographies with ‘process’ geographies, 
thereby infusing area studies with the global processes that link world regions together, 
generating imaginative new ‘pictures of the world’ 
                                                          
3 While the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US resulted in a brief revival of official calls to continue 
developing “area specialists” in the Middle East, the so-called “war on terrorism” has yet to mark a reversal 
of the shift in area studies towards globalization and integration. For a related discussion, see Wang (2002). 
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 (http://www.regionalworlds.uchicago.edu). Similarly, the Ford Foundation has made a 
now well-known shift away from areas per se and toward innovative boundary-crossing 
work, sponsoring, for example, special ‘boundary-crossing’ panels at annual AAS 
meetings. And the focus of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) is now ‘to 
understand how the culture, history, and language of a local context shape its interaction 
with, for example, the evolution of market institutions and engagement with international 
market forces’ (Heginbotham 1994, p. 37). As the SSRC sees it, scholarship should be 
‘context-sensitive,’ and thus not committed to traditionally received ‘areas’ or countries. 
Thus, sub-national regions, and supranational regions are now important too, as are 
perspectives in which ‘global-local processes’ come into focus (Abraham and Kassimir 
1997). ‘The geographic scope of area studies programs will need to be broader and more 
highly diversified than in the past. Contexts will be defined less exclusively by 
political/military/security criteria and more by a mix that includes economic, trade, 
cultural, legal, educational, and communications criteria’ (Heginbotham 1994, pp. 37-38). 
It is increasingly recognized that ‘areas’ are highly differentiated, requiring greater 
sensitivity to local context. 
 
This shift has not occurred without a great deal of reflexive concern among area studies 
scholars. There was some concern expressed at a joint meeting between the SSRC and the 
American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) in April 1997 over whether the 
international program in area studies funding was reinforcing an ‘ideology of 
globalization,’ in which history was being marginalized (Abraham and Kassimir 1997, p. 
28). This concern can also be read as one over the increasing interest in and concern over 
the production of geographical knowledge. Thus, an unstated theme underlying the shift 
in area studies has been the uncritical enshrining of a new set of geographical categories 
for knowledge production: spatial interaction, diffusion, transnationalism, global-local, 
region, locality, and the like. 
 
Cumings (1997) has argued that the new geography of area studies is marked by a 
striking (and surprising) lack of political economy in general, and attention to ‘the global 
corporation’ in particular. Such a lack represents an unwillingness or an inability to 
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 reflect on what he finds most troubling in the relationship between area studies 
scholarship and national political and economic interests: ‘To put a subtle relationship all 
too crudely, power and money have found their subject first, and shaped fields of inquiry 
accordingly’ (1997, p. 9). It is now clear that cold war security concerns not only 
provided the major policy and funding push for the development of area studies following 
World War II, but also seriously compromised the scholarly integrity of many area 
studies programs in the US through their direct links to national security institutions such 
as the OSS, CIA and the FBI. What is generally less clear, however, is that the current 
shift in area studies scholarship mirrors a related shift in the broader political economy of 
the world system and the changing situation of the United States within that system. 
Today we may look back on cold war area studies scholarship and lament from a safe 
historical distance the blatant compromises of academic freedom that often occurred. We 
perhaps lack a similar reflexivity, however, regarding the broader political economic 
conditions for the contemporary construction of area studies knowledge, a point noted by 
Cumings: ‘Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the new SSRC/ACLS restructuring 
and the apparent new direction of the major foundations is the absence of any reference to 
the basic motivation for so many of the new tendencies in the 1990s world that they hope 
to adapt themselves to, namely, the global corporation’ (1997, p. 26). Area Studies, 
according to Cumings, should remain focused on political economy to redress this 
disappointment. 
 
The Commodification of Knowledge 
Thorough and bracing as Cumings’s critique is, it falls short of interrogating the political 
economic processes that shape geographical knowledge at the beginning of the 21st 
century. These processes are part of what Rafael calls a distinctly ‘North American style 
of knowing,’ one that is ‘fundamentally dependent on, precisely to the extent that it is 
critical of, the conjunction of corporate funding, state support, and the flexible managerial 
systems of university governance characteristic of liberal pluralism’ (Rafael 1994, p. 41). 
 
What is happening in area studies is reflected at the larger scale of the North American 
university itself. That is, a general trend toward the corporatization of the university and 
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 the commodification of higher education (Mitchell 1999; Robins 2000). Readings 
describes the trend thus: ‘the University is becoming a transnational bureaucratic 
corporation, either tied to transnational instances of government such as the European 
Union or functioning independently, by analogy, with a transnational corporation’ (1996, 
p. 3). This trend has been succinctly captured in such brave-new-world terminology as 
‘digital diploma mills,’ the ‘knowledge universe’ (convicted junk-bond trader Michael 
Milken’s new business venture), the ‘virtual university,’ and some of the more tongue-in-
cheek versions: ‘McCollege’ and the ‘APM’ or ‘Automatic Professor Machine’ (Noble 
1997). Facing state-mandated budget cuts, universities increasingly turn to corporate 
partnerships, many of which are not fully disclosed and thus raise serious questions about 
academic freedom and the ownership of intellectual property (Mitchell 2001). Not 
surprisingly, the transformation of education in the digital age has become the policy 
objective of state governments throughout the US. In Washington State, Governor Gary 
Locke formed a panel in 1998, called the 2020 Commission, to consider the future of 
education in the state (Mitchell 1999). The panel included ‘21 of the state’s best and 
brightest community leaders,’ not one of which was a university teacher. Rather the panel 
included CEOs of Weyerhaueser Company, Costco, and many other corporate interests. 
The panel advocated a shift in thinking about higher education, in which digital distance 
learning would streamline bloated university budgets and staff, where universities would 
be held accountable for their ‘output’ and where students would become ‘customers’ in a 
competitive education marketplace. 
 
This system of ‘flexible education’ mirrors a broader political economy of ‘flexible 
specialization’ in late capitalism. Indeed, Robins (2000) has argued that the virtual 
university represents less a technological change in education than a changing political 
economy of education associated with the forces of globalization. Robins sees 
universities increasingly serving the function of providing skilled workers for the needs 
of transnational capital. This perspective has been echoed by Readings (1996), who has 
argued that the university as we know it is a defunct institution that was created to serve 
the national interests of the 19th century state. This ‘cultural university’ of the 19th and 
20th centuries is being replaced by the ‘technological university,’ the ‘corporate 
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 university,’ and the ‘University of Excellence’ of the 21st century, in which national 
knowledge is replaced with ‘dereferentialized knowledge.’ Readings calls it nothing short 
of ‘rethinking the categories that have governed intellectual life for over two hundred 
years’ (p. 169). Nor is this a call for a more multicultural or cultural studies-oriented 
curriculum, for these too often serve to merely legitimize the corporate commodification 
of knowledge, emphasizing hybridity and transnationalism in ways that strikingly parallel 
the vision statements of companies like Microsoft, Nike, and Coca-Cola (Dirlik 1994; 
Mitchell 1997). For Readings, Cultural studies ‘presents a vision of culture that is 
appropriate for the age of excellence (Readings 1996, p. 11; see a similar critique in 
Wang 2002). 
 
It should not be surprising, then, that even Area Studies institutions like the AAS 
maintain a substantial stock portfolio. Scholarly institutions need to be players if they are 
to survive. But the question is not whether the AAS, or universities, should or should not 
be in the business of international investing. Rather, the question is how do we situate our 
scholarship in a world where the political economy of knowledge production is 
undergoing immense transformation. It is this question of political economy, raised 
earlier by Cumings, that lies at the core of my argument here. For all the anxiety over the 
shifts in area studies funding priorities, the futures of the AAS and so on, there remains 
very little sustained analytical interrogation of the role of capital in shaping the 
knowledge universes that we inhabit. 
 
Scaling Geographical Knowledge 
In addressing this question, I want to focus on the production of geographical knowledge, 
for if the shift in area studies mirrors a transformation in the global political economy 
where the scales at which geographical knowledge is produced have themselves shifted, 
then even non-area related disciplinary approaches in humanities and even social sciences 
are themselves being spatialized. Ever since Foucault (1996, p. 22) proposed that we now 
live ‘in the epoch of space,’ ‘mapping’ has become the metaphor of the times in ‘cutting-
edge’ scholarship. The increasing interest in global-local relationships, in traditional areas 
differentiated into more context-specific regions and localities, in a borderless world, in 
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 globalization, in the progressive potential of the Internet, World Wide Web, and 
multiculturalism—all of these derive in part from capital’s own need to produced new 
spatial scales of accumulation and, thus, associated scales for the production of 
geographical knowledge (Brenner 1997; Cartier 2001; Harvey 1995). Shifting scales of 
knowledge represent capital’s incessant efforts to abstract from the actual social 
conditions of production, such that they become mystified into absolute categories of 
culture, ethnicity, locality, nation, or region (Comaroff & Comaroff 2000). 
 
Geographers in particular have been engaged in a sustained critique of what has been 
called capital’s ‘production of scale,’ and this work offers a basis from which to critically 
interrogate the production of knowledge in today’s area studies fields (Smith 1986, pp. 
57-78). Of course, a critique of capital’s production of scale is simply part of the more 
general theoretical argument, ‘that scale is neither an ontological given and a priori 
definable geographical territory nor a political neutral discursive strategy in the 
construction of narratives’ (Swyngedouw 1997, p. 140). This is because different 
processes produce different scales of activity and meaning. Scales of processes that we 
find important (the local, the global, the regional, whatever) ‘are the result, the product of 
processes, of sociospatial change’ that is ‘always heterogeneous, conflictual, and 
contested. Scale becomes the arena and moment, both discursively and materially, where 
sociospatial power relations are contested and compromises are negotiated and regulated. 
Scale, therefore, is both the result and the outcome of social struggle for power and 
control’ (p. 140). Events such as the 1997 collapse of the baht in Thailand are the result 
of innumerable scaled processes coming together at a particular location and time. We 
should be thinking of these scaled processes and how they come together in space and 
time to affect disruptive change. Rather than merely injecting the political economy of 
the global corporation into our scholarship of spatial processes, then, a critical area 
studies needs to be focusing on how, and in whose interests, scales of knowledge are 
being produced and contested. 
 
To put it another way, the production of scale raises two important issues of concern to 
area studies fields. Most obvious is that Appadurai’s ‘process’ geographies make a lot of 
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 sense, affording a new look at the ‘regional worlds’ in which different geographical 
understandings are formulated as people encounter the increased flows and disjunctures 
of the global economy. Rather than reifying areas and regions, we should be focusing on 
‘the struggles between individuals and social groups through whose actions scales and 
their nested articulations become produced as temporary standoffs in a perpetual 
transformation of sociospatial power struggle’ (Swyngedouw 1997, p. 141). The other 
issue raised by the production of scale is that despite the sense that ‘process’ geographies 
make, it is perhaps more important to realize that scaled processes occur at all scales, that 
they are unruly, but that they are more often than not dominated by power whereby 
particular scales emerge to displace others. The regional, it turns out, tends to be one of 
those scales dominated by power. Thus, the ‘process’ of capital, Wilson and Dirlik (1995, 
p. 6) observe, has been actively producing the scale of the ‘Pacific Rim’ as a ‘coherent 
region of economic exchange,’ and thereby actively repressing those scales of knowledge 
produced by less hegemonic interests: those of inter-island cultural and social interaction 
and differentiation. (see also Cumings 1993). This is something about which Appadurai 
seems to have much less to say, and which brings us to Harvey’s recent observations 
regarding the production of geographical knowledge and our role as critical academics. 
 
Geographical knowledge, Harvey observes, is very difficult to pin down in theoretical 
terms. Perhaps this explains some of the defensiveness of the area studies tradition with 
regard to theory: ‘Geography is an empirical form of knowledge that is marked as much 
by contingency and particularity as by the universality that can be derived from first 
principles’ (Harvey 2000, pp. 534-35; see also Ong 1999, pp.10-11). This contingent and 
particularistic quality of geographical knowledge can be disturbing to other forms of 
rational understanding, such that ‘the insertion of space (let alone of tangible 
geographies) into any social theory … is always deeply disruptive of its central 
propositions and derivations … This disruptive effect makes space the favored metaphor 
in the postmodernist attack…upon all forms of universality’ (Harvey 2000 p. 539). From 
the view of philosophy, this is profoundly ironic, because it was space, after all, that was 
enshrined by Kant as the ultimate category of universalist thinking in the first place 
(Casey 1997). But in fact geography is fragmented, synthetic, unruly and subject to 
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 appropriation by any and all; it is a form of knowledge difficult to contain. This is why 
the line is often blurred between geography as a source of resistance to power—for 
example in the turn to local knowledge and diversity in the face of the homogenizing 
forces of globalized mass production—and geography as a source of legitimacy for all 
forms of bigotry and the exclusionary politics. This latter use of geography can be seen in 
the turn to locality as an exclusive enclave where outsiders aren’t welcome, as in the rise 
of local nationalisms, anti-immigrant politics, and conservative legislation that attempts 
to banish the ‘outsiders’ among us: gays, lesbians, the homeless. 
 
The unruly production and appropriation of scaled geographical knowledge is perhaps 
most clearly illustrated these days on the World Wide Web, where all kinds of 
geographical knowledge are being produced and disseminated instantaneously. The Web 
illustrates well the blurry lines between geographies of power, appropriation, and 
resistance. But despite the free-wheeling and chaotic nature of the internet, where a 
seemingly infinite number of spaces for the production of knowledge pop up—to use a 
Chinese metaphor—like mushrooms after a spring rain, the production and dissemination 
of geographical knowledge on the web remains dominated by powerful commercial and 
communications interests who write a regional world in very selective ways. 
How, for example, is the geography of China being written on the English-language Web 
these days? Since the mid-1990s, dozens of major English language web sites devoted to 
disseminating information about China as a new region on the frontiers of global 
capitalism have sprung up. One is Inside China Today (ICT), run by the European 
Internet Network (EIN) which was founded in 1995 to update global professionals on 
current events and business opportunities in post-socialist Central Europe 
(http://www.einnews.com/china/). Now covering some 240 countries (at last count) EIN 
aims its sites at the world’s business elite, those seeking opportunities in the emerging 
markets of post-socialist states and other world regions. In the month of October, 2000, 
EIN sites received some 6 million page views from 350,000 ‘unique users,’ 68% of 
whom lived in North America, 75% of whom were male, nearly half of them earning over 
$50,000. ICT—‘a service for global professionals’—features news, with an emphasis on 
business news, but also offers ‘country info,’ ‘discussion chat,’ ‘dating,’ and an extensive 
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 online shopping department. Like other sites constructing a comprehensive regional 
geography aimed at the global investor, ICT represents itself not simply as a provider of 
information, but as an online ‘China community’ that inhabits the virtual space of the 
region it seeks to construct. 
 
ICT gets plenty of competition from China Online, based in Chicago 
(http://www.chinaonline.com/default.asp). China Online offers much the same business-
oriented approach to China as ICT, but also claims to offer its information faster than 
other providers. China Online also used to feature an ‘entertainment and lifestyle’ site 
called China Pop, ‘providing fresh, unique, wholesome programming to the Chinese-
speaking world and sponsorship opportunities to companies seeking to increase their 
brand building and business prospects in China.’ While this cultural side of the business 
has apparently been dropped, China Online still ‘offers media companies high-quality 
content, which in turn helps them to expand viewership and increase advertising 
revenues.’ Like ICT, China Online is a subscription-based service and, also like ICT, 
counts among its subscribers many universities and educational institutions around the 
world. 
 
The point here is not that business-oriented web sites should not be in the business of 
producing geographical knowledge. Rather, it is that ‘China’ has become an 
overdetermined geographical category, a ‘scale’ representing the convergence of capital 
interests. As a region, China is being produced for global consumption in many different 
ways, but particularly in ways that are dominated by the interests of capital. Scholarship 
that examines China in terms of ‘process’ geographies must first and foremost 
acknowledge how dominant interest are at work in producing the scale at which China 
becomes recognizable in the first place. 
 
Producing Regionalism 
These ideas offer a critical interrogation of the shift in area studies broached at the 
beginning of this paper. They suggest that the shift itself is part of broader shift in the 
political economy of capitalism. They also suggest that the issue is not whether this shift 
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 is a good or bad thing. Rather, the issue is our recognition that we are engaged in a field 
of geographical knowledge production in which there are many powerful agents 
contributing to the restructuring of the scales in which that knowledge is expressed. As 
area scholars we are not ourselves particularly powerful actors in this restructuring; but 
that doesn’t mean we simply accept spatial restructuring as a given. Nor does it mean that 
we must become willing contributors to dominant agents of the restructuring of 
geographical knowledge. In this final section I want to explore further the ways regional 
scales of knowledge—particularly those constructing regional cultural categories—are 
being restructured as part of the dynamic political economic processes transforming Asia 
and its relation to the global economy. I focus on the region because a restructured 
regionalism seems to be the most obvious outcome of the shifts in area studies 
scholarship described above. 
 
Despite the fact that the rhetoric of globalization often assumes that the global and local 
scales are the only ones that matter anymore, empirical analysis reveals that state 
territorial regulation and planning still influences the geography of global capital a great 
deal.4 Indeed, ‘competitive advantage’ in the global economy often depends on 
regionally-specific factors that are created or encouraged by state practice (Dicken 1998). 
For states, benefiting from globalization may thus entail a careful balancing between 
cultivating place-specific development advantages while at the same time conforming to 
global standards of deregulation in local labor and financial markets. One region-specific 
factor that states often seek to cultivate as a development advantage which does not 
threaten the uniform standards sought by investors is distinctive regional culture (Kearns 
& Philo 1993; Lash & Urry 1994; Zukin 1995; Dirlik 1996; Peet 1997). One of the ways 
that territoriality remains important in a globalizing world, then, is in its demarcation of a 
culture region that is somehow attractive to deterritorialized capital. Such attractiveness 
may be expressed in many ways: a culture of skilled and hardworking laborers, a culture 
of entrepreneurialism, or a culture of ‘traditional’ values and beliefs conducive to 
modernization. It is often the state’s role to actively represent regional culture in these 
                                                          
4 For celebrations of the demise of regional boundaries, see Castells (1989) and Ohmae (1990). For the 
counterargument, see Cox (1997) and Storper (1997). 
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 terms, while seeking to erase any negative cultural images that may commonly be held 
about the region (Morley & Robins 1995). 
 
The increasing interest among business elites in the importance of regional culture 
reflects common assumptions held in explaining the successful ‘tigers’ and ‘dragons’ of 
the ‘Asian economic miracle’ (Gertler 1997). Here, cultural factors are said to facilitate 
the needs of advanced, ‘flexible’ capitalism: inter-firm cooperation and collaboration, 
vertical disintegration in large firms, and diverse forms of outsourcing (Harrison 1992; 
Leung 1993). Production, in other words, is seen as more dependent on social relations 
than in the past, suggesting an advantage for regions with the appropriate ‘traits,’ such as 
strong cultural bonds of kinship, ethnicity, language, and/or religion (Kotkin 1993). A 
well-established literature on ‘Chinese capitalism’ tends to situate the success of overseas 
Chinese business within a discourse of time-honored ‘Confucian values’ and 
‘Chineseness.’ (Chan & Chiang 1994; Weidenbaum & Hughes 1996). Thus, explanations 
of Chinese business networks have emphasized the kinship and native-place based 
practice of guanxi, or ‘connections’ (Redding 1990; Yang 1994). 
 
As Ong (1999, p. 68) notes of these kinds of ‘trait’ geographies, ‘Chinese race, culture, 
and economic activities have become naturalized as inseparable or even the same 
phenomena.’ (see also Berger 1996). It is the production of the regional scale that enables 
such cultural coherencies to emerge. Olds and Yeung (1999, p. 541) have also criticized 
much of this work for explaining regional Chinese business networks according to 
‘internalized factors associated with culture and identity’ expressed at regional scales. In 
fact, the scale of ‘Chinese capitalism’ as a regional phenomenon is highly contested and 
shifting. Olds and Yeung argue that ethnic Chinese business networks are increasingly 
disrupted by external forces of global capital, compelling them to adopt more ‘credible’ 
and ‘transparent’ management practices as defined by global financial gatekeepers—
those who perhaps also bookmark Inside China Today or China Online on their web 
browsers. What these critiques point to is the role of ideology among state and business 
elites. Although Asian states must, in essence, ‘play by the rules or be left behind,’ they 
actively promote a rhetoric of cultural difference vis-à-vis the west, that adds a dynamic 
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 dimension to their competitiveness. Maintaining an ideology of regional culture serves to 
distinguish a territorial region, increasing its visibility in the pathways of capital, while 
allowing conformity with the norms of the deregulated global economy. 
Ching also sees such regionalist projects as ideological formations. He adds that, 
conceiving regionalism as a discursive construct instead of an empirical reality serves better to 
explain the differing constructions of regionalist projects within late capitalism. Political and 
economic rationalism alone cannot explain why Asian regionalism has been, more often than not, 
articulated on cultural grounds rather than on grounds that are economic (as in North America) or 
political (as in Western Europe) (2000, p. 239). 
 
The answer is not simply that the regionalist discourse of ‘Asian values’ or ‘Chinese 
capitalism’ depends on an ideology of culturalism, but that such ideologies are mobilized 
as politics of scale, in which state interests converge with and negotiate those of 
international capital. 
 
This leaves us with a need to recognize that the shifting categories by which our 
knowledge is produced, disseminated, and received, are not innocent. Certainly they 
cannot be celebrated as ‘innovative’ or ‘cutting-edge,’ as if capital had never heard of 
transnationalism or hybridity until scholars started tossing these ideas around. We need to 
be aware of the broader context for the shift in area studies and that ‘crossing borders’ 
(disciplinary, international, social, or mental) does not necessarily mean much more than 
just keeping up with the times. If, however, we wish to do more than ‘keep up with the 
times,’ then a critical focus on the production of scale seems a good place to start. 
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